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¶1  In this age of digital music, online-movie streaming, and rapidly advancing 
technology, the need for a revised Copyright Act is no secret.1 Even Maria Pallante, the 
Register of Copyrights and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office, has spoken about the 
need for sweeping change, stating: “[T]here comes a time the subject ‘ought to be dealt 
with as a whole, and not by further merely partial or temporizing amendments.’”2 While 
Ms. Pallante was speaking broadly of the need for in-depth revision of the Copyright Act,3 
this Note focuses on a subset of the Copyright Act: the First Sale Doctrine (the Doctrine), 
which grants certain rights to purchasers of copyrighted material. More specifically, this 
Note focuses on both the need for a revision of the Doctrine, and what a revision to this 
Doctrine might look like.  
¶2  Currently, the Doctrine is too rigid in the face of evolving modern technology. The 
Doctrine was written at a time when copies of a work were tangible and burdensome to 
make, while today digital copies can be made with just the click of a button. Because of 
this change, a formalist application of the Doctrine often produces absurd results, harming 
both copyright holders and consumers. Instead, a functionalist approach to the Doctrine 
and a more flexible rule are needed to address these technological advances, which were 
unforeseen when the Doctrine was first introduced.  
¶3  Part II begins the analysis by exploring the statutory landscape of copyright law as it 
relates to the Doctrine. Part III examines two recent cases interpreting the Doctrine: 
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons4 and Capitol Records v. ReDigi.5 Part IV analyzes these 
decisions and explores the potential effects that the decisions might have on the secondhand 
market, black market, and pirated goods generally. Part V discusses the considerations and 
challenges that must be addressed when crafting a new rule. Finally, Part VI suggests a 
more flexible Doctrine, using a functionalist approach to resolve some of the problems that 
have arisen—and continue to arise—with the current Doctrine as technology advances.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. History of the Copyright Act and First Sale Doctrine 
¶4  Congressional authority for the Copyright Act comes from Article 1, Section 8, 
Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, whose purpose is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”6 The first Copyright Act was enacted in 
1790, permitting authors to obtain a fourteen-year copyright for “maps, charts, and books,” 
which granted exclusive rights to “print, reprint, publish, or vend” the authors’ respective 
 
1 See Ted Johnson, Register to Call for Major Revision to Copyright Law, VARIETY (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://variety.com/2013/digital/news/register-to-call-for-major-revision-to-copyright-law-1200326105/. 
2 Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 319 (2013) (quoting 
Thorvald Solberg, Copyright Law Reform, 35 YALE L.J. 48, 62 (1926)).  
3 See id. 
4 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).  
5 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
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works.7 The Copyright Act was amended in 1831 to include musical compositions and to 
extend the copyright term to twenty-eight years for all works.8  
¶5  In 1908, the Supreme Court established the First Sale Doctrine in Bobbs-Merrill Co. 
v. Straus, holding that:  
[O]ne who has sold a copyrighted article, without restriction, has parted 
with all right to control the sale of it. The purchaser of a book, once sold by 
authority of the owner of a copyright, may sell it again, although he could 
not publish a new edition of it.9 
In essence, the Doctrine establishes that once a copyrighted work is sold, the initial 
purchaser may dispose of the work as she sees fit, as long as she does not copy the original 
work. Further, the Court held that giving notice of a restriction on future sales was 
insufficient, and that such a restriction applies only to parties in privity of contract.10 For 
more than half a century, the Doctrine derived its authority from common law, until the 
Copyright Act of 1976 officially codified this longstanding legal maxim.11 
¶6  Three sections in the Copyright Act of 1976 are particularly important to this Note. 
The first is § 106, which grants authors exclusive rights in their works, such as the right to 
control the reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works.12 The second is § 109, 
which codifies the Doctrine.13 Section 109 goes on to describe other exceptions—and 
 
7 Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124. 
8 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, Ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436. 
9 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908). 
10 Id. 
11 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 109, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 109 
(2012)). 
12 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). Section 106 provides authors exclusive rights: 
 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale 
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission. 
 
Id. Each of the § 106 exclusive rights is crucial in deciding if and how new services and technologies 
infringe on authors’ copyrights. This Note, however, focuses primarily on the exclusive rights to making 
and distributing copies of copyrighted works, which a revised Doctrine would most directly implicate. 
13 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). Section 109 codifies the Doctrine, stating: 
 
 (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of [§] 106(3), the owner of a particular copy 
or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is 
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy or phonorecord. . . .  
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exceptions to those exceptions—that apply specifically to computer software.14 The third 
is § 602, which outlines rules for the importation and exportation of copyrighted works.15 
Specifically, § 602 provides that importing copyrighted works acquired outside of the 
United States without the copyright holder’s consent constitutes an infringement of the 
author’s exclusive rights under § 106.16 Section 602 then lists specific exceptions to this 
prohibition on importation,17 including importation under government authority, personal 
use not intended for distribution, and importation by or for organizations with scholarly, 
educational, or religious purposes.18 Understanding how these three provisions relate is 
essential to any analysis of the Doctrine and its application. 
B. Legal Distinctions Between Print and Digital Media 
¶7  Although courts and Congress have recognized that digital media may require special 
treatment,19 the current Doctrine, as a whole, nevertheless applies to print and digital media 
alike.20 Yet the Doctrine was codified long before digital media’s inception. New copyright 
issues continue to emerge from the increased prevalence of digital media, posing 
difficulties that require courts to interpret this archaic Doctrine in light of modern 
realities.21 Two of these issues—licensing and protective software—illustrate the 
complexities and nuances that arise in the digital copyright context, and how drafting 
legislation that addresses evolving technology is uniquely difficult. Subsection (1) 
evaluates § 109’s amendment limiting the Doctrine’s application to computer programs, 
and how this targeted legislation affected, and continues to affect, software providers and 
end-users. Subsection (2) addresses the use of digital rights management (DRM) 
technology, which protects software from unlawful replication, and how Congress’s 
attempt to devise a legislative solution fell short of achieving its intended result. In the end, 
 
 . . . .  
 (b)(1)(A) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), unless authorized by 
the owners of copyright in the sound recording or the owner of copyright in a computer 
program . . . and in the case of a sound recording in the musical works embodied therein, 
neither the owner of a particular phonorecord nor any person in possession of a particular 
copy of a computer program . . . may, for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial 
advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the possession of that phonorecord or 
computer program . . . by rental, lease, or lending, or by any other act or practice in the 
nature of rental, lease, or lending. 
 
Id. § 109 (a)–(b)(1)(A).  
14 Id. § 109 (b)(1)(B)–(b)(2). While these are important parts of the Copyright Act, the intricacies of 
computer licensing extend beyond the intended scope of this Note. 
15 17 U.S.C. § 602 (2012). 
16 Id. § 602(a)(1).  
17 Id. § 602(a)(3). 
18 Section 602, and specifically the exception for scholarly and educationally organizations, was 
particularly important in the Kirtsaeng decision discussed infra Part III. In that case, the U.S. Supreme 
Court confronted the issue of whether the Doctrine’s geographical reach extends to foreign-produced 
books, which, as evinced by the conflicting opinions, ultimately highlights the need for the Doctrine’s 
statutory revision. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
19 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(b), 1201. 
20 See, e.g., Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
21 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Some New Kinds of Authorship Made Possible by Computers and Some 
Intellectual Property Questions They Raise, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 685 (1992). 
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both scenarios provide guidance as to how legislation could rectify the Doctrine’s current 
flaws.   
1. Licensing 
¶8  One of the first questions to surface with the Doctrine’s application to modern 
technology involved computer software.22 Congress amended § 109 to limit the Doctrine’s 
applicability to computer software.23 Unless permitted by the copyright holder, no “person 
in possession of a particular copy of a computer program . . . [may] dispose of . . . [a] 
computer program . . . by rental, lease, or lending.”24 This allows the owner of a copyright 
in software to maintain his exclusive distribution rights with respect to renting, leasing, or 
lending the software program. 
¶9  Copyright holders who qualify for this exception often employ form contracts, or 
end-user license agreements (EULAs),25 which can be modified to “permit the contracting 
flexibility that is essential for today’s software products.”26 Typically included within 
software packaging or displayed on a computer screen,27 an end-user agrees to the contract 
by performing a certain act, such as by opening the box or clicking a button.28  
¶10  Although these “contracts of adhesion” have garnered much criticism,29 EULAs 
often grant legal rights to consumers that they otherwise would not have had.30 For 
instance, EULAs might grant consumers the right to distribute materials using certain fonts 
from a word-processing program or the right to make, copy, and sell derivative works using 
sample source code.31 EULAs allow software providers to protect their innovative 
technology from exploitative uses, which, without § 109’s restrictions, would 
impermissibly limit end-users’ rights under the Doctrine.32 And while software providers 
could ostensibly negotiate with each purchaser, the transaction costs of doing so would 
hinder the dissemination of this beneficial technology by increasing market prices.  
¶11  In sum, EULAs both protect copyrights from infringement and grant distinct rights 
to consumers. Without over burdening end-users, these licensing schemes provide 
flexibility for innovators and thus facilitate technological development, illustrating how 
specifically tailored legislation can resolve issues that arise from the application of 
antiquated law to novel innovation.  
 
22 See id. 
23 17 U.S.C. § 109(b). 
24 Id. § 109(b)(1)(A). 
25 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market Software 
License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335, 339 (1996). 
26 Id. at 366.  
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. “The increasing ability to expand protection for copyrighted works through the use of non-
negotiable ‘contracts’ is troublesome . . . . [J]ustifications for this contract-based approach are based on 
assumptions about contract formation that are not present in the modern software industry. . . . [I]t is a 
threat to the delicate balance of public policy that supports intellectual property law.” Craig Zieminski, 
Game Over for Reverse Engineering?: How the DMCA and Contracts Have Affected Innovation, 13 J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 289, 330 (2008). 
30 Zieminski, supra note 29, at 354–55. 
31 Id. 
32 See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.  
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2. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
¶12  Digital rights management (DRM) technology is another way to protect copyrighted 
digital works from exploitation.33 DRM technology prevents users from making copies of 
copyrighted digital works without a password.34 However, in the 1990s, as parties began 
developing DRM technology, others attempted to devise DRM-circumvention technology, 
often with much success.35  
¶13  In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to combat 
the proliferation of DRM-circumvention technology, criminalizing the production, 
distribution, or use of services aimed at bypassing these access controls.36 Importantly, as 
the DMCA currently stands, the threshold for violating the DMCA is lower than that for 
copyright infringement.37 Although a bill was recently introduced in the U.S. House of 
Representatives requiring an actual copyright violation to occur for liability under the 
DMCA to arise, it never reached a vote, meaning that the use of a DRM-disabling program 
or device is currently illegal unless one of the few anti-circumvention exemptions apply.38  
¶14  The DMCA’s reach extends far beyond its likely intended scope, criminalizing 
certain uses of software that qualify as fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107.39 Because of this 
broad scope, many argue that the DMCA actually stifles the development of DRM 
technology. For example, unwary academics researching DRM-circumvention software 
can easily violate the DMCA unintentionally, which in turn deters beneficial research.40 
One commentator noted:  
The science of cryptography depends on cryptographers’ ability to 
exchange ideas in code, to test and refine those ideas . . . . By 
communicating with other researchers and testing each others’ work, 
cryptographers can improve the technologies they work with, discard those 
that fail, and gain confidence in technologies that have withstood repeated 
testing.41 
 
33 Victor Mayer-Schonberger, Beyond Copyright: Managing Information Rights with DRM, 84 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 181, 181 (2006). 
34 Id. at 182. 
35 Id. at 184–85 (“To break out of this straight-jacket, many tools have been developed and remain 
available on the Internet to either strip the music from FairPlay restriction data, or to otherwise enable the 
unauthorized sharing of DRMed music content. Creating, disseminating and using such tools may be 
potentially illegal, but nevertheless continues to take place.”). 
36 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012). 
37 See id.; cf. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
38 Unlocking Technology Act of 2013, H.R. 1892, 113th Cong. (2013).  
39 Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501, 
509 (2003). 
40 Id. at 503 (“Thus, even though academic encryption researchers can continue to conduct and publish 
some of their research under the DMCA without significant practical risk of criminal or civil liability, the 
DMCA significantly affects the manner in which that research is conducted.”). 
41 Id. at 511 n.37 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Dr. Steven Bellovin et al. at 14, Universal City Studios, 
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-9185), available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/NY/appeals/010126-cryptographers-amicus.pdf). 
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Unlike the amendment to § 109, the DMCA’s over-inclusive scope has created a chilling 
effect on independent research, which is a necessary component for improving anti-
circumvention technology.42 The DMCA’s innovation-stymieing impact likely outweighs 
the benefits stemming from its deterrent effect.43 
¶15  In addition, the DMCA limits online service providers’ liability for copyright 
infringement committed by their users.44 Consequently, the DMCA provides strict 
copyright protection in that it applies to any action meant to circumvent DRM technology 
regardless of whether a copyright violation actually occurred. But at the same time, the 
DMCA makes detecting and punishing digital copyright violations more difficult by 
excluding service providers from its reach, instead focusing primarily on the innumerable, 
widely-dispersed, and effectively anonymous individuals attempting to circumvent DRM 
technology.45 Ultimately, the DMCA’s over-inclusiveness and rigid mandate serve as a 
cautionary tale for any subsequent attempts to regulate evolving technology.  
III.  KIRTSAENG & REDIGI  
¶16  Part III turns to the Doctrine’s current application. Part III(A) analyzes the most 
relevant case, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., and explores the reasoning behind the 
differing opinions. Part III(B) then discusses Capitol Records LLC v. ReDigi, Inc.—an 
ongoing case before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York—which, 
read in tandem with Kirtsaeng, suggests that unintended consequences, ranging from 
increased piracy to heightened financial burdens for libraries, are likely to result without a 
change to the Doctrine.  
A. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
¶17  In Kirtsaeng, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether reselling imported, 
foreign-produced textbooks violated copyright law.46 John Wiley & Sons (Wiley), a global 
provider of educational solutions and products, often publishes textbooks through its 
network of wholly owned subsidiaries in Asia.47 In this case, Wiley claimed that it retained 
the copyrights to all works published abroad, which were identical to the American 
versions except for a copyright notice in the foreign-produced books stating: 
 
42 See id. at 509–10. 
43 See Zieminski, supra note 29, at 324 (“[B]ecause of the intertwined nature of idea and expression 
within software, and because of the gatekeeper function performed by access control measures, new 
restrictions on reverse engineering allow parties to monopolize ideas using the Copyright Act.”). 
“Copyright law, even as it relates to computer programs, has never before offered monopoly protection for 
ideas, processes, and functions. This inconsistency is a warning sign that lawmakers have over-restricted 
reverse engineering.” Id. at 326.  
44 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
45 Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 695, 
717–18 (2011) (“Nevertheless, the exemption has operated in the context of P2P file sharing to negate the 
scalable enforcement mechanism that notice and takedown provides. Inasmuch as P2P file sharing shifts 
the locus of infringing activity from the storage function to the transmission function, it places such activity 
beyond the knowledge and control of the ISP and thus beyond the reach of the enforcement scheme created 
by § 512(c).”). 
46 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
47 Id. at 1356; see About Wiley, JOHN WILEY & SONS, http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-
301695.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).  
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Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd[.] All rights reserved. 
This book is authorized for sale in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle 
East only and may not be exported out of these territories. Exportation from 
or importation of this book to another region without the Publisher’s 
authorization is illegal and is a violation of the Publisher’s rights. The 
Publisher may take legal action to enforce its rights. . . .48 
¶18  Kirtsaeng, a Thai national, studied abroad in the United States and noticed the price 
difference between textbooks sold in the United States and the same textbooks sold in 
Thailand.49 While studying in the United States, Kirtsaeng instructed his family and friends 
to buy textbooks from local Thai bookstores and ship the textbooks to him in the United 
States.50 He then sold the books, reimbursed his family and friends, and kept the profits.51 
In 2008, Wiley sued Kirtsaeng in federal court for copyright infringement.52  
¶19  In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court held in favor of Kirtsaeng.53 Justice Breyer 
delivered the majority opinion, Justice Kagan issued a concurring opinion, and Justice 
Ginsburg dissented.54 Although each opinion weighed the legal effects on publishers and 
purchasers, the opinions varied as to the realistic consequences of limiting the Doctrine’s 
reach and the proper application of conflicting statutory language.55 Taken together, these 
opinions demonstrate a clear need for a more flexible rule that better balances conflicting 
interests. 
1. Majority Opinion 
¶20  Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer held that the Doctrine permits selling 
foreign-printed secondhand books in the United States, regardless of § 602’s conflicting 
importation restrictions.56 The Court relied on Quality King Distributers v. L’anza, where 
it found that the § 602 importation limitations did not apply to previously exported U.S.-
printed books that were subsequently imported back to the United States.57 By extending 
its reasoning in Quality King, the Court held that § 602’s reference to § 106 intended to 
incorporate all of the § 106 exceptions, including the Doctrine.58  
¶21  The key factual difference between Kirtsaeng and Quality King concerned the 
allegedly infringed books’ geographical origins. In Quality King, the books were printed 
in the United States, whereas the books in Kirtsaeng were printed abroad.59 Because of this 
 
48 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting J. WALKER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICS vi (Wiley Int’l 
Student ed., 8th ed. 2008)).  
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 1354.  
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 1354–71 (majority opinion); id. at 1373–91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan’s balancing 
is more indirect, as she agrees with the majority’s reasoning, but mentions that Congress might want to 
intervene, suggesting she is skeptical about the actual result. Id. at 1372–73 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
56 Id. at 1358–60 (majority opinion). 
57 Id. at 1355; Quality King Distribs. v. L’anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135 (1998). 
58 Quality King Distribs., 523 U.S. at 144.  
59 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1355. 
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geographic distinction, the Kirtsaeng Court’s focus turned to what Congress intended by 
including § 109’s reference to “lawfully made under this title.”60 Determining whether the 
law was meant to include foreign-printed books required the Court to adopt either a 
geography-based or non-geography-based reading of § 109.61 The geography-based 
reading would apply § 109 only to those books made in the geographic jurisdiction of the 
United States,62 while the non-geography-based reading would interpret “lawfully made 
under” to mean “in compliance with,” thus extending the Doctrine to books published 
abroad.63 The majority adopted the non-geography-based reading.64 As a result, because 
Wiley’s Asian subsidiary had permission to print the books, the foreign-produced books 
were “lawfully made under this title” and subject to the Doctrine, making Kirtsaeng’s 
actions legal.65  
¶22  Beyond matters of statutory interpretation, the majority referenced the impact a 
geographical reading could have on libraries, used-book sellers, and museums, among 
others.66 For instance, the Court imagined an onerous process requiring libraries to track 
down and receive author permission for every foreign-printed book in their collections 
before being able to lawfully lend such books.67 Seeking to avoid this result, and bolstered 
by their holding in Quality King, the majority found that Kirtsaeng had not infringed 
Wiley’s copyright.68 But by granting the Doctrine extraterritorial application, the Kirtsaeng 
majority’s interpretation essentially gutted § 602(a)(1), taking away one of the few 
advantages print publishers have left in this digital age. 
2. Justice Kagan’s Concurrence 
¶23  Although Justice Kagan agreed with the majority’s reasoning and decision, she noted 
that Kirtsaeng and Quality King, when read together, limited § 602(a)(1) to “a fairly 
esoteric set of applications.”69 Justice Kagan suggested this limitation did not result from 
the Kirtsaeng majority’s faulty reasoning, but rather from the holding in Quality King.70 
She clarified, however, that the solution to this problem should not be to “misconstrue 
§ 109(a) in order to restore § 602(a)(1) to its purportedly rightful function,” but that 
Congress should provide statutory guidance as to the correct interpretation of these 
conflicting provisions.71   
3. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent 
¶24  Justice Ginsburg began her opinion quoting United States v. American Trucking: 
“[I]n the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe 
 
60 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).  




65 Id. at 1358–59. 
66 Id. at 1364–65. 
67 Id.  
68 See id. at 1371. 
69 Id. at 1372 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1373. 
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the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.”72 Coupled with her criticism of 
the Court’s “bold departure from Congress’[s] design,” Justice Ginsburg asserted that the 
effects of a geography-based interpretation of § 109, which the Court cited as both “too 
serious” and “too likely to come about,” were both unlikely to occur and outweighed by 
the far more probable adverse impact on publishers.73 For Justice Ginsburg, the practical 
negative effects of the non-geography-based reading of “lawfully made under this title” 
overshadowed the “largely imaginary” “parade of horribles” the majority described.74 
¶25  Justice Ginsburg also referenced the texts of §§ 106(3), 109, and 602(1), and the 
reasoning behind Quality King—a decision in which she concurred.75 Indeed, Quality King 
strongly supported her interpretation of § 602: 
If the author of [a] work gave the exclusive United States distribution 
rights—enforceable under the Act—to the publisher of the United States 
edition and the exclusive British distribution rights to the publisher of the 
British edition, . . . presumably only those [copies] made by the publisher 
of the United States edition would be “lawfully made under this title” within 
the meaning of § 109(a). The First Sale Doctrine would not provide the 
publisher of the British edition who decided to sell in the American market 
with a defense to an action under § 602(a) . . . .76 
Justice Ginsburg criticized the Kirtsaeng majority for dismissing this language as “ill-
considered dictum,” and noted that the Court’s unanimity in Quality King further bolstered 
her § 602 interpretation.77  
¶26  The opinions in Kirtsaeng show how statutory interpretations can diverge as a result 
of textual ambiguity. Rather than seeking a middle ground that would protect both 
copyright holders and book lenders, the Court chose to side with the latter.78 And while 
Justice Ginsburg’s stance would protect publishers, it would nevertheless leave open the 
remote possibility that libraries could face copyright infringement suits for circulating 
foreign-produced books without authors’ consents.79 The Court missed an opportunity to 
adopt a functionalist approach that would not only find Kirtsaeng’s actions illegal, but also 
protect libraries acting in good faith from the “parade of horribles” the majority described. 
B. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc. 
¶27  On its face, Capitol Records v. ReDigi—an ongoing case before the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York—seems unrelated to the outcome in 
Kirtsaeng.80 But, if the issues decided in summary judgment are affirmed,81 this rigid, 
 
72 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542 
(1940)).  
73 Id. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 1374.  
76 Id. at 1375 (quoting Quality King Distribs. v. L’anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 148 (1998)). 
77 Id. at 1376. 
78 See id. at 1364 (majority opinion). 
79 See id. at 1386 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
80 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
81 Id. 
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formalist application of copyright law could prompt seismic changes in digital media, 
especially when read in tandem with Kirtsaeng. Moreover, as copyrighted digital media 
becomes more prevalent, the ReDigi decision could have extensive influence as courts 
inevitably face analogous scenarios.   
¶28  ReDigi addressed “whether a digital music file, lawfully made and purchased, may 
be resold by its owner through ReDigi under the First Sale Doctrine.”82 The court held that 
the Doctrine did not apply.83 ReDigi is an online marketplace that allows users to trade 
iTunes files with other ReDigi users by uploading their files to ReDigi’s cloud.84 Before a 
user can upload a track, however, ReDigi screens the track to make sure it is a lawfully 
purchased iTunes file.85 Files ripped from CDs or acquired by means other than iTunes are 
not eligible for the service.86 Once uploaded to the cloud, the track is deleted from the 
originating computer, permitting the user to access the file but only from the cloud.87 
Although the files are not deleted automatically—users must do so themselves—ReDigi 
suspends accounts for those who do not comply.88 Thus, when a user decides to trade one 
of his uploaded tracks for a new track, he loses access to the original track.89 Because only 
one copy of a particular music file exists upon both upload and download, ReDigi argued 
that the service refrained from impermissibly copying an author’s copyrighted work.   
¶29  But the district court was not convinced.90 The court focused on the physical, rather 
than the digital, aspects of file transferring.91 The court stated that, for purposes of applying 
the Copyright Act, “reproduction occurs when a copyrighted work is fixed in a new 
material object.”92 The court further asserted that “when a user downloads a digital music 
file or ‘digital sequence’ to his ‘hard disk,’ the file is ‘reproduce[d]’ on a new phonorecord 
within the meaning of the Copyright Act.”93 Therefore, because “[i]t is simply impossible 
that the same ‘material object’ can be transferred over the internet,” the digital transmission 
of a music file necessarily creates a new phonorecord, and the Doctrine does not protect 
the selling of copies of purchased phonorecords.94  
¶30  The court noted, however, that selling the hard drive or iPod upon which the digital 
file was first downloaded would be permissible in the same way that selling a used CD 
would be permissible.95 While acknowledging that this was potentially “more onerous” 
than reselling a CD, the court believed the result was “hardly absurd” because “the First 
 
82 Id. at 648. 
83 Id. at 660. 
84 Id. at 645. Uploading files to ReDigi’s cloud is essentially just uploading them to ReDigi’s servers. 
Eric Griffith, What Is Cloud Computing?, PC MAG. (Mar. 13, 2013), 
www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372163,00.asp (“In the simplest terms, cloud computing means storing 
and accessing data and programs over the Internet instead of your computer's hard drive. The cloud is just a 
metaphor for the Internet.”). 
85 See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 645. 
86 Id. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 646. 
90 Id. at 650. 
91 Id. at 649. 
92 Id. at 648 (emphasis in original). 
93 Id. at 649. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 656. 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 5  
 
 244 
Sale Doctrine was enacted in a world where the ease and speed of data transfer could not 
have been imagined.”96 
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPACT 
A. How Kirtsaeng and ReDigi Could Quicken the Death of Print Media 
¶31  The decline of print media is apparent. Bookstores across the country are shuttering 
their windows and print newspapers are becoming obsolete.97 With the rise of iPads and 
other tablets, fewer consumers are purchasing hardcopy books and magazines.98 In only a 
few short decades, printed books could very well go the way of the vinyl record—only 
owned and read by true bibliophiles and collectors.  
¶32  Kirtsaeng and ReDigi have potentially accelerated this process, especially when 
interpreted together. As Justice Ginsburg mentioned in her dissent, gutting § 602 could 
have disastrous effects on international publishing.99  
¶33  With respect to textbooks, international pricing could increase significantly. In order 
to deter the importation of less-expensive foreign versions of their books to the United 
States, publishers may be forced to raise prices in foreign markets. In many of these 
countries, most individuals would be unable to afford these increased costs. For example, 
the average law school textbook in the United States costs approximately $200, which 
amounts to nearly half the average monthly salary for those living in urban China and more 
than double the average monthly salary of those living in India.100 By comparison, 
adjusting these numbers to the median income in Chicago, this would be similar to charging 
approximately $2,000 or $8,500, respectively, for a law school textbook.101  
¶34  Higher books prices abroad, in turn, would likely cause an increase in counterfeits. 
Expensive items that can be reproduced easily and cheaply attract counterfeiters. 
Moreover, books are especially easy to copy—one original purchase can produce 
innumerable copies for resale. For example, on Amazon.com, The Textbook of Spinal 
 
96 Id.  
97 American Bookshops in Decline, Beyond Borders, THE ECONOMIST (May 21, 2011, 5:39 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2011/03/american_bookshops_decline; Michaelle Bond, For 
Newspapers, A Less Than Daily Future, AM. JOURNALISM REV., June–July 2012, available at 
http://ajrarchive.org/Article.asp?id=5342 (“Most of the 38 news executives surveyed in a Pew Research 
Center report released in March predicted that, in five years or so, daily papers would be printed less 
frequently, maybe just on Sunday.”). 
98 Bond, supra note 97. 
99 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1373–74 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
100 China’s 2011 Average Salaries Revealed, CHINA DAILY (July 6, 2012),  
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-07/06/content_15555503.htm; India’s Monthly Average Income 
Rose to Rs 5,130 in 2011–12, ECON. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-01-31/news/36658764_1_cent-current-prices-capita-
income. 
101 Area Median Income Chart, CITY OF CHICAGO, 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/dcd/supp_info/area_median_incomeamichart.html (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2013). Numbers based off dividing median annual income for one person by twelve, then dividing 
by two for China comparison and multiplying by two for India comparison. Numbers rounded to nearest 
$500. 
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Surgery sells for $343.99, a 20% savings from the list price.102 In contrast, on a popular 
Chinese website, TaoBao.com, a counterfeit copy of the same textbook sells for $29.30.103  
¶35  Thus, on the one hand, employing identical pricing models in the United States and 
foreign markets is clearly unsustainable. Yet at the same time, if cheaper, foreign-produced 
textbooks flood the U.S. market, publishers will be forced to lower prices to compete. In 
short, U.S. textbook publishers are facing a potentially industry-altering dilemma.  
¶36  But ReDigi—if it becomes binding precedent—could provide a simple remedy for 
publishers: transition to digital textbooks. By eliminating costs associated with print books, 
such as production and storage costs, publishers would be able to lower prices and thus 
avoid pricing themselves out of foreign markets. Additionally, moving to digital textbooks 
would reduce competition from the used-textbook market. Unlike a print textbook, a digital 
textbook cannot be sold separately from the iPad to which it was originally downloaded. 
Assuming most tablet owners are unwilling to sell their tablets at prices that used-book 
shoppers are willing to pay, an influx of digital textbooks would substantially diminish the 
used-textbook market. And because of this reduced competition from used-textbook 
sellers, publishers would be under less pressure to produce new editions as frequently, 
resulting in additional cost savings. Thus, while Kirtsaeng might initially appear pro-
consumer, its effects might actually culminate in a panacea for publishers. 
B. Contrary to Its Intent, Kirtsaeng Will Harm Libraries and Used-Book Sellers 
¶37  The Kirtsaeng majority attempted to avoid interpreting § 109 in a way that would 
negatively affect libraries. The majority discussed at length the briefs submitted by the 
American Library Association and other book-lending advocates, and how limiting 
“lawfully made under this title” to a geography-based interpretation would expose libraries 
to copyright infringement lawsuits.104 While it seems unlikely that parties holding decades-
old foreign copyrights would begin scouring U.S. libraries in order to sue for copyright 
infringement,105 § 602 nevertheless applies to libraries.106 But the limitations in § 602 do 
not apply to “importation by or for an organization operated for scholarly, educational, or 
religious purposes and not for private gain.”107 This means that U.S. libraries are free to 
circulate foreign-copyrighted books imported for library use. In contrast, foreign-
copyrighted books imported for other reasons and subsequently donated to libraries are 
subject to § 602’s abrogation of the Doctrine. Practically, however, the likelihood of a 
 
102 The Textbook of Spinal Surgery, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/Textbook-Spinal-Surgery-
Keith-Bridwell/dp/0781786207 (last visited Nov. 28, 2014). 
103 The listed item has since been removed, but counterfeits on Alibaba’s Taobao.com are common. See 
Sophia Yan, Alibaba Has a Major Counterfeit Problem, CNN MONEY (Sept. 11, 2014),  
http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/11/technology/alibaba-counterfeit-ipo/ (“In its IPO prospectus, Alibaba 
warned potential investors that it could come under fire for alleged counterfeit activity, as it did between 
2008 and 2011, when the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative labeled Taobao as a ‘notorious 
marketplace’ with ‘widespread availability of counterfeit and pirated goods.’”). 
104 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1364–66 (majority opinion). 
105 Id. at 1389 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Most telling in this regard, no court it appears, has been called 
upon to answer any of the court’s ‘horribles’ in an actual case.”).  
106 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3)(C) (2012). 
107 Id. 
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foreign copyright holder not only discovering that a copy of his book ended up in an 
American library improperly, but then also deciding to sue, is slight.108 
¶38  While the Kirtsaeng majority’s decision saved libraries from this unlikely threat, it 
might have exposed them to a far greater one. If ReDigi becomes binding precedent, how 
can libraries adapt in a world where printed books are increasingly becoming obsolete? At 
first blush, the solution seems clear: rent e-books. But if ReDigi and modern e-book 
licensing practices take hold, libraries will likely find the transition to e-book lending 
difficult.  
¶39  Currently, libraries must enter into licensing agreements if they choose to rent e-
books.109 Instead of owning copies of e-books, libraries pay subscription fees to publishers 
and are subject to these licensing agreements’ terms, such as geographical restrictions on 
renting specific e-books.110 As opposed to buying one copy of a book and renting it to 
library-goers indefinitely, libraries must not only pay initial subscription fees for e-books, 
but also pay to renew an e-book license upon its expiration. 
¶40  As e-books become more popular, this licensing system will likely impose further 
burdens on libraries. Publishers are increasingly concerned about monetizing e-book 
distribution methods, prompting various licensing restrictions on library-rented e-books.111 
For example, HarperCollins limits the number of times a particular copy of an e-book can 
be checked out to twenty-six.112 Additionally, if the ReDigi logic finds widespread 
acceptance, publishers will gain more bargaining power when negotiating with libraries 
because, in light of the financial benefits of licensing discussed supra Part IV(a), fewer 
incentives would exist for publishers to agree to a system where libraries can purchase, 
rather than license, e-books.  
¶41  As far as Kirtsaeng helps speed the decline of print media, without a more flexible 
Doctrine, the decision leaves libraries in a precarious position. It seems unlikely that an 
owner of a copyright in a foreign-produced book would pursue legal action against a library 
for lending a copy of her book without first obtaining consent. However, the numerous 
financial benefits stemming from e-book licensing agreements may prompt publishers to 
be more protective of their rights in digital media, posing a far more realistic and costly 
burden on libraries. 
C. Kirtsaeng and ReDigi Will Exacerbate the Problems of Counterfeiting and Piracy 
¶42  Prohibiting the sale of used digital files will uniquely affect the market for digital-
media products. Traditionally, retail purchasers buy a book or CD at full price and then sell 
it at a significantly reduced, used-good market rate.113 This not only permits a buyer to 
recoup a portion of the initial price when he no longer wants an item, but also allows those 
 
108 See id. 
109 Dahleen Glanton, Publisher Puts New Limits on Library E-Books, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 6, 2011), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-03-06/news/ct-met-library-e-books-20110306_1_e-books-
harpercollins-library-users. 
110 Benedicte Page & Helen Pidd, Ebook Restrictions Leave Libraries Facing Virtual Lockout, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/oct/26/libraries-ebook-restrictions. 
111 Glanton, supra note 109. 
112 Id. 
113 See Cary T. Platkin, Comment, In Search of a Compromise to the Music Industry’s Used CD 
Dilemma, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 509, 525 (1995). 
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who either cannot afford or are unwilling to pay full price the option to purchase the used 
good.114 Under ReDigi, however, selling used digital files becomes prohibitively 
expensive.115 For example, few people are willing to sell a computer or iPad because they 
no longer want a Lady Gaga album purchased in 2009. 
¶43  Studies on the psychology of consumers who buy counterfeit or pirated products 
show how stifling the used-good market might affect consumer activity. With counterfeit, 
tangible goods, buyers understand they are obtaining a lower quality product, but choose 
to purchase the counterfeit version because it costs less than the genuine product.116 The 
difference between consumers who buy counterfeit goods versus legitimate goods is 
usually that a shopper’s economic concerns outweigh her aversion to risk.117 Thus, if a 
counterfeit’s quality increases while the price of the legitimate good rises, more consumers 
will be inclined to buy a counterfeit instead of the legitimate good.  
¶44  Moreover, with most pirated digital goods, people receive the exact same product 
without paying market price. As a result, digital copyright holders offset these financial 
losses by increasing market prices, which in effect penalizes those consumers who act 
lawfully.118 Yet many choose to ignore this disparate consumer burden, instead justifying 
piracy as a response to wealthy copyright holders’ demands for remuneration.119 Referred 
to as equity theory, commentators identify this concept as one of the primary causes of 
piracy120: “[W]ith regard to digital media, . . . pirates perceive the prices for digital goods 
to be high, and view this as inequitable, particularly given the economic success of some 
of the copyright holders. Pirates use this disparity to justify their illegal behavior.”121 
Further, the intangible nature of digital goods emboldens those adhering to this rationale 
because pirating imposes few obvious costs. Pirating does not deprive anyone from 
 
114 Id. at 528. 
115 See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (suggesting the 
permissibility of selling the hardware upon which a digital file was downloaded). 
116 Gail Tom et al., Consumer Demand for Counterfeit Goods, 15 PSYCHOL. & MKTG. 405, 412 (1998) 
(“Consumers who stated a preference for counterfeit goods indicated greater satisfaction with the 
durability/quality of legitimate versions of the product than with the counterfeit version and greater 
satisfaction with the prize [sic] of counterfeit goods than legitimate goods.”). 
117 Id. at 414–16. 
118 See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, THE TRUE COST OF SOUND RECORDING 
PIRACY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 14 (2007), available at 
http://www.ipi.org/docLib/20120515_SoundRecordingPiracy.pdf. Piracy’s impact extends to all corners of 
the U.S. economy: 
 
[T]he U.S. sound recording industries are now sustaining approximately $5.33 billion in 
losses as a result of global and U.S. piracy. In addition, U.S. retailers are losing another 
$1.04 billion. These estimates suggest total “direct” losses to all U.S. industries from 
music piracy that exceed $6.37 billion. These direct losses then cascade through the rest 
of the U.S. economy and the losses of economic output, jobs and employee earnings 
“multiply.” Based on the analyses set forth in this paper, because of music piracy, the 
U.S. economy loses a total of $12.5 billion in economic output each year. 
 
Id. at 14–15.   
119 Charles W. L. Hill, Digital Piracy: Causes, Consequences, and Strategic Response, 24 ASIA PAC. J.  
MGMT. 9, 12 (2007). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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receiving the same file, and for most media-users, any monetary impact seems 
infinitesimal. Ultimately, it is easy for many to believe, albeit erroneously, that digital 
piracy is a victimless crime.  
¶45  These factors combine to create an environment where black markets can flourish. 
Coupled with the oft-subscribed to equity theory, if quality and risk are all that typically 
keep consumers from buying counterfeit goods, what will happen when quality increases, 
risk decreases, and companies refuse to allow those who have played by the rules to resell 
their goods? Discussed infra Part V, a more flexible Doctrine could alleviate some of these 
tensions and potentially reduce incentives for black markets to develop. 
V. A SOLUTION 
¶46  When applied to modern technology, the Doctrine’s flaws are clear. How to resolve 
these shortcomings is far less apparent. Part V discusses the necessary flexibility of an 
adequate solution, and analyzes the considerations and challenges to crafting this malleable 
rule. 
A. The Need for a More Flexible Rule 
¶47  A more flexible rule governing copyright law is needed to rectify the problems with 
the current Doctrine. The ReDigi court aptly noted: “[T]he [F]irst [S]ale [D]octrine was 
enacted in a world where the ease and speed of data transfer could not have been 
imagined.”122 In short, the Doctrine is outdated. Although applying the old rule to both 
print and digital media raises various concerns, this Note does not argue for the Doctrine’s 
abandonment. Instead, Congress should draft a rule based on intent and practical effect 
rather than the technology available at the time. With technology’s increasing prevalence 
in daily life, media-users need to maintain some semblance of control over their media 
property.  But a new, rigid rule granting media-users control over digital property could 
easily become as analogously unworkable as the current Doctrine. Thus, an adequate 
solution must be sufficiently flexible to apply consistently, regardless of the type of 
technology in question. 
B. Considerations and Challenges 
¶48  Developing a more flexible rule requires balancing various interests. On the one 
hand, the rule needs to be flexible enough to adapt to changing technology. On the other 
hand, the rule needs to provide predictability, such that copyright holders and media-users 
have a clear understanding of their rights and responsibilities. This Section explores the 
intent, effect, and fairness considerations that Congress should take into account when 
revising the Doctrine, as well as the challenges of drafting a rule that adapts to quickly 
changing technology.  
1. Intent 
¶49  Two aspects of intent are pertinent to drafting a more suitable rule: congressional 
intent and the intent of the person violating the law. Congress needs to make its intent 
 
122 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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textually clear in the law itself, which in turn will shape how the law is applied. 
Additionally, the law should include a culpability element, aiming to punish those who 
knowingly exploit the law to take advantage of copyright owners, not those who use digital 
products in accordance with traditional fair-use standards. 
¶50  Although Congress intended the provisions of the DMCA to “serve as technological 
adjuncts to the exclusive rights granted by copyright law,”123 the DMCA prevents certain 
uses of circumvention technologies that otherwise constitute fair use.124 If the law 
considered intent, however, media-users would no longer be liable for innocent conduct 
and anti-circumvention technology would actually improve. Although Congress attempted 
to draft the DMCA in a manner that would not “chill[] legitimate scientific encryption 
research,” the exemption for beneficial research is criticized by many “for being both too 
narrow and too vague.”125 By permitting independent researchers to work more freely on 
breaking anti-circumvention software, software companies would gain a better 
understanding of how pirates exploit their software. Software companies would then be 
able to improve anti-circumvention technology accordingly.  
¶51  This culpability element would not negate liability for those using anti-
circumvention software to pirate digital media. Crucially, this would allow courts to judge 
the merits of a case without having to caution against negatively affecting unrelated parties 
acting in good faith. For instance, the Court would likely have reached a different result in 
Kirtsaeng if a culpability requirement had been in place. The Court could have found 
Kirtsaeng, who was clearly looking to profit by exploiting Wiley’s international 
distribution and pricing, to be in violation of the law, without fearing that the holding would 
negatively affect libraries. Unforeseen and complex issues will undoubtedly surface as 
technology progresses, which necessitates a sufficiently flexible rule to effectuate the 
Doctrine’s intent and provide adequate protection for media-users and copyright holders. 
2. Effect   
¶52  Any revisions to the Doctrine need to weigh the potential effects on copyright 
owners, especially whether the resulting societal benefits will offset the reduced incentive 
to innovate. After all, Congress’s constitutional mandate is “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.”126 Thus, the law should not be over-inclusive, especially for 
trivial matters. For example, the law should provide for a different outcome in Kirtsaeng 
without causing libraries to worry about the origins of every foreign book in their 
collections. But at the same time, trivial matters can add up, specifically when seemingly 
inconsequential effects accumulate to inhibit a law’s efficacy. Stated differently, the law 
needs to provide sufficient copyright protection to prevent the steady attrition of authors’ 
exclusive rights.  
¶53  But finding this balance poses myriad challenges. If courts allow copyright holders 
to pursue trivial claims, a quagmire of copyright infringement lawsuits would likely result, 
cluttering court dockets and stymieing judicial economy. The complexities of rapidly 
 
123 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998 U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE SUMMARY 3 (1998), available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf. 
124 Liu, supra note 39, at 509–10. 
125 Liu, supra note 39, at 509–10, 511 n.37.  
126 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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changing technologies exacerbate this problem, where seemingly insignificant claims 
might later have unanticipated and sweeping consequences. Additionally, courts would 
need to approach each claim on a case-by-case basis, calculating the likely effects on the 
copyright holder in each instance. Consequently, with numerous courts across the country 
interpreting the new copyright statute, developing a cohesive body of case law will be 
difficult—that is, in the initial absence of Supreme Court guidance—without a sufficiently 
explicit statutory mandate. Indeed, because of the fact-specific nature of copyright 
infringement lawsuits and the challenges of interpreting the law in light of evolving 
technology, it might take many years of applying the new Doctrine before judicial 
consensus exists as to what constitutes a trivial versus problematic claim. Given these 
points, resolving the Doctrine’s shortcomings likely requires sufficiently tailored 
legislation that courts interpret in a functionalist, rather than formalist, manner.     
3. Fairness 
¶54  A revised Doctrine also needs to balance competing fairness interests between 
copyright holders and media-users. Although recalibrating intellectual property law to 
address changed circumstances often requires weighing various fairness considerations,127 
digital media’s uniquely replicative nature distinguishes it from products with qualitatively 
distinct forms. As digital technology improves, fewer discernable differences in quality 
between “new” and “used” media exist. For example, while someone might choose to buy 
a new CD rather than a used one for fear of purchasing a scratched disc, this problem does 
not arise in the digital music context. 
¶55  Because a digital file can be copied ad infinitum without losing its quality, treating 
digital-media resellers like other resellers is unfair to copyright holders in digital media.128 
Few incentives exist to buy music new when a purchaser can get the same music file at a 
significant discount the next day. Accordingly, many argue that restricting the Doctrine to 
non-digital goods aligns with the Doctrine’s intent:  
[T]he purpose of the first-sale exception is not to give unlimited ability to 
individuals to distribute their copies of a work, but rather to permit 
individuals to distribute copies they lawfully own when such distribution 
would not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work or adversely 
affect the legitimate interests of the copyright owner in that work.129 
This argument clearly makes sense in some cases, such as those situations imagined by § 
109(b), in which the owner of a particular copy rents that copy to others for commercial 
gain.130  On the other hand, prohibiting a consumer from reselling a purchased good solely 
because it exists on a different medium conflicts with the fundamental fairness 
 
127 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); RESTATEMENT THIRD OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28 (1995) 
(describing the affirmative defense of fair use in trademark law if “the actor has used the term fairly and in 
good faith”). 
128 Keith Kupferschmid, Lost in Cyberspace: The Digital Demise of the First-Sale Doctrine, 16 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 825, 848 (1998). 
129 Id. at 847. 
130 See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.  
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considerations the original Doctrine embodies.131 From the album owner’s perspective, the 
sale is the same whether the album is on a vinyl record, CD, or an MP3. An individual 
purchasing a digital song is not asking for unlimited distribution rights to that song, but 
rather the opportunity to resell the original product as if she had bought the song on a 
tangible medium. 
¶56  Additionally, restricting the Doctrine’s application to non-digital goods would inhibit 
access to digital media for those who cannot afford to pay full price. And, as discussed 
supra Part IV(c), piracy increases when consumers feel they are being treated unfairly. For 
a revised law to avoid these issues, it will need to incentivize parties to both create and 
purchase copyrighted material, while allowing consumers to buy and sell copyrighted 
goods on the secondhand market. 
C. A Recent Example: Bowman v. Monsanto 
¶57  Bowman presented the Supreme Court with an interesting example of how advancing 
technology raises issues that were unanticipated when a law was first drafted. While the 
Court’s decision does not directly address copyright law, it nevertheless illustrates how a 
more flexible rule might mitigate problems resulting from the application of old law to new 
technology, specifically by considering intent, effect, and fairness.   
¶58  In Bowman, a farmer had purchased genetically modified soybeans from 
Monsanto.132 These “Roundup Ready” beans are resistant to certain herbicides, allowing 
farmers to use herbicides on crops to kill weeds without harming the crops.133 Farmers buy 
the beans under a special license, which permits them to harvest the beans only once.134 
Under the license, farmers can sell the beans, but not replant them.135 Although Bowman, 
the farmer, adhered to these terms in the past, he bought seeds from a local grain elevator 
where he knew other farmers had deposited already-harvested Roundup Ready beans.136 
Bowman then planted these beans, applied the herbicide, and collected the seeds from the 
surviving plants.137 In this way, he was able to harvest multiple crops of Roundup Ready 
beans without purchasing them through Monsanto.138 When Monsanto discovered this 
practice, it sued Bowman for patent infringement.139  
¶59  Bowman raised the affirmative defense of patent exhaustion, claiming that Monsanto 
could not control his use of the beans because he had acquired them through a prior 
authorized sale.140 More specifically, Bowman argued that he had not made the new 
 
131 “The doctrine prevents copyright owners from restraining the free alienability of goods.” J.D. 
Schneider, Kirtsaeng: Copyright’s “First Sale” Doctrine and Foreign-Manufactured Goods, COLO. LAW., 
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exhaustion, the authorized sale of a patented article gives the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, a right to 
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soybeans; rather, the beans had “naturally self-replicate[d],” creating replicas of 
Monsanto’s patented beans.141 As a result, Bowman claimed he had used the beans in 
accordance with Monsanto’s license agreement because their reproduction was merely 
incidental to his otherwise permissible use thereof.142  
¶60  But the Court disagreed, stating that Bowman’s intentional actions were precisely 
how one would make a new plant.143 The Court noted that eating, selling, or feeding the 
beans to livestock was allowed under the patent exhaustion doctrine.144 Bowman infringed 
Monsanto’s patent by actively sorting through and determining which beans were the 
patented ones and then planting and harvesting the patented beans to avoid buying them 
for the following harvest season. 145 The Court found that “the exhaustion doctrine does 
not enable Bowman to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s 
permission.”146 The Court further reasoned that if patent exhaustion was a viable defense, 
Monsanto’s patent would provide few benefits.147 While Monsanto would receive 
compensation for the first harvest, farmers would have no reason to continue buying from 
Monsanto.148 By continuing to use the licensing agreements, farmers benefited from the 
beans and Monsanto was compensated for its innovation through additional sales of 
Roundup Ready.149 
¶61  Perhaps most important, the Court explicitly limited its holding.150 The Court 
recognized the unique nature of the beans and that “such inventions are becoming ever 
more prevalent, complex, and diverse. In another case, the article’s self-replication might 
occur outside the purchaser’s control. Or it might be a necessary but incidental step in using 
the item for another purpose.”151 The Court acknowledged the challenges of applying static 
legal doctrines to modern technology and the danger of overly broad opinions producing 
absurd results.152 While this case involved a patent, the Court’s analysis nevertheless 
illustrates what a court should consider when addressing intellectual property rights in new 
technology. Applying a similar approach to copyright cases should produce similarly just 
results for both copyright holders and consumers. 
D. A Functionalist Solution 
¶62  Both the Court’s application of patent law and the type of licensing agreement used 
in Bowman provide guidance in the digital media context. Analogous to easily copied 
digital files, the Roundup Ready beans in Bowman could self-replicate, which prompted 
Monsanto to devise an agreement restricting the use of the seeds after the first harvest.153 
The Court, recognizing the nuances of this innovative technology, refrained from 
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overextending its decision, focusing instead on Bowman’s intentionally exploitative 
conduct.154 And most pertinent to our analysis, the Court acknowledged that necessary but 
incidental copies might be permissible in certain circumstances, which mirrors the 
incidental copies necessary to selling used digital files through an ReDigi-like platform.155 
However, unlike the Court in Bowman, the ReDigi court adopted a formalist approach to 
find that the incidental digital copies violated copyright law.156  
¶63  Further, Monsanto’s licensing agreement provides a potential model for agreements 
between digital copyright holders and media-users. For example, online music could be 
sold with a license that allows media-users to sell both the digital files and the incidental 
copies necessary to transferring a song to other consumers. Similar to the reasoning behind 
fair use and copyright term limits, these licensing arrangements would provide a workable 
framework that both protects copyright holders from exploitative conduct and promotes 
the Doctrine’s fundamental principles. Specifically, a license could allow for general fair 
use of the digital files, while prohibiting owners from reselling the digital files for a certain 
length of time. Following this reselling-prohibition period, media-users would be permitted 
to sell the digital file through a system similar to the one found in ReDigi, provided that 
media-users delete the original files.   
¶64  Regardless of any licensing arrangements, the most important aspect of any solution 
hinges on whether courts adopt a functionalist approach when applying the Doctrine. The 
formalistic application of antiquated laws is bound to produce absurd results. Copyright 
law needs to be sufficiently flexible to adapt to new circumstances and specific situations. 
In Bowman, for instance, the farmer’s intent was clear in that he devised a plan to reproduce 
the patented seeds and reap the benefits of Roundup Ready without paying Monsanto 
additional compensation.157 The Court reasoned that planting the seeds amounted to 
“making” new seeds.158 But what if Bowman had simply bought the seeds from the grain 
elevator and planted them without spraying the herbicide? In that case, he would have no 
way of knowing which, if any, of the plants resulted from Roundup Ready seeds, and thus 
would not have received any unfair benefits. In other words, would the Court still reason 
that he “made” the seeds?  
¶65  Only a dynamic approach can hope to resolve this inevitable uncertainty. Courts need 
to be able to adapt in this ever-evolving context and apply the law fairly, equitably, and 
predictably. With technology’s exponential progression, a rigid, formalist approach to 
copyright law likely precludes the availability of an adequate solution.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶66  The First Sale Doctrine is too rigid in the face of modern technology. A formalist 
application of the Doctrine produces absurd results, harming both copyright holders and 
consumers. A more flexible rule and functionalist approach is needed as technology 
continues to advance in ways that could not have been predicted when the Doctrine was 
first introduced. By considering intent and effect, and taking a more functionalist approach 
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to new issues arising in copyright law, courts can apply the Doctrine in a way that is more 
flexible, fair, and consistent; one that sufficiently balances the needs of consumers and 
copyright holders as technology continues to progress in innumerable ways. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
